Article 2 (General Obligations/Obligations Générales) by Lambert, H
Cite as: Hélène Lambert, ‘Article 2 (General Obligations/Obligations Générales), in T. Einarsen 
and A. Zimmermann (eds.), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol: A Commentary, OUP 2021. 
 
Article 2 
(General Obligations/Obligations Générales) 
Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in 
particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for 
the maintenance of public order. 
Tout réfugié a, à l’égard du pays où il se trouve, des devoirs qui comportent notamment 
l’obligation de se conformer aux lois et règlements ainsi qu’aux mesures prises pour le 
maintien de l’ordre public. 
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A. Function of Article 2 
1 It has long been recognized that treaties may grant direct rights to individuals or 
impose direct obligations on them.1 The origins of a specific provision on the duties of 
refugees in the 1951 Convention has been traced back to international aliens law and the law 
relating to the protection of national minorities.2 More specifically, aliens had to comply with 
and respect the laws of the local State, for instance by paying taxes.3 However, the local State 
could not claim an unrestricted right to require aliens to serve in its military forces. Nor could 
it claim absolute discretion in the treatment of aliens ‘in respect of those matters which 
concern the personal relationship between an individual and his State, or his political rights 
and duties’.4 During the first half of the 20th century, treaties relating to asylum were also 
adopted, requiring States to ensure that refugees do not perform acts contrary to the peaceful 
nature of asylum.5 
2 Article 2 of the 1951 Convention constitutes the first provision to refer to the 
duties of refugees in the context of an international status. It does so in the spirit of the 
Preamble, acknowledging ‘the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees’ 
and requesting that all States ‘do everything within their power to prevent this problem from 
becoming a cause of tension between States’.6 It was introduced in the draft 1951 Convention 
‘for psychological reasons, and to maintain a balance’ because it was felt that too much 
 
1 PCIJ, Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion of 3 March 1928, Series B, No. 15. At the time, 
of course, the PCIJ assumed that such rights and duties would be enforced by domestic courts. Meron, AJIL 94 
(2000), pp. 239, 253. 
2 Hathaway, Rights, pp. 75–83, 81. 
3 Jennings/Watts, Oppenheim’s, vol. I/2–4, p. 905. 
4 Ibid., pp. 907, 909. 
5 E.g. Convention on Asylum (Havana, 1928), Art. 2(5); Treaty on Asylum and Political Refuge (Montevideo, 
1939), Art. 12; cf. also Art. 18 Convention on Diplomatic Asylum. 
6 For further details cf. Alleweldt, Preamble 1951 Convention MN 58–61. 
emphasis in the draft was put on the rights and privileges of refugees.7 For the sake of 
convenience, and with the refugee in mind—when he or she consults the 1951 Convention—
provisions on the duties of refugees were inserted at the outset, just after the definition. 
Hence, Art. 2 has been described as a ‘qualifying clause to Article 1’.8 Its wording is based 
on Art. 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) according to which: 
‘Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his 
personality is possible.’ It was recently embraced in the New York Declaration for Migrants 
and Refugees: ’39. …We also note the obligation of refugees and migrants to observe the 
laws and regulations of their host countries’. This commentary highlights an overwhelming 
lack of State practice on Art. 2 due to its character as a moral obligation. Of the handful of 
court decisions referring to Art. 2, it notes a tendency in some countries (e.g. Canada and 
New Zealand) to use Art. 2 beyond its original scope and the overall humanitarian purpose of 
the 1951 Convention. 
B. Historical Development 
I. Instruments Prior to the 1951 Convention 
3 Article 2 has no precedent in previous instruments relating to refugee status (i.e. the 
1933 and 1938 conventions). Prior to the 1951 Convention, a special status was granted only 
to specific categories of refugees.9 In some cases, the benefit of these conventions was 
extended to other categories of refugees (e.g. to refugees from Austria by way of an 
additional protocol to the 1938 Convention or to Spanish refugees by way of a decree in 
France).10 In 1949, it was agreed that the way forward should be the conclusion of a new 
 
7 Conference of Plenipotentiaries, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3 (1951), p. 21. 
8 Statement of Robinson (Israel), ibid. 
9 For further details cf. Skran, Historical Development MN 98–103, passim; Schmahl on Art. 1 A, para. 1 MN 6, 
passim; Einarsen, Drafting History MN 8–11. 
10 For further details cf. Schmahl on Art. 1 A, para. 1 MN 50; Skran, Historical Development MN 68. 
convention which would apply in principle to all categories of refugees to whom it is 
intended to give an international status.11 
II. Drafting History of Article 2 
4 A preliminary draft convention was submitted as a basis for discussion at the first set 
of meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems.12 Among the 
guiding principles underpinning this draft was the principle that: 
(c) In view of the fact that the refugee has been received by a country enabling him to lead a 
normal life, there is no reason why he should elude certain especially heavy obligations which 
are incumbent on the nationals of the country, namely, military service and other personal 
services.13 
5 The following provisions were thus included in the preliminary draft 1951 
Convention in the second subdivision relating to the status of refugees properly so-called: 
Chapter IV—Responsibilities of refugees and obligations incumbent upon them 
Article 10—General obligations 
Refugees (and stateless persons) authorised to reside in a country must conform to the laws in 
force.14 
 . . .  
Article 11—Fiscal charges 
 . . .  
Article 12—Military service and other personal services 
The High Contracting Parties reserve the right to subject refugees (and stateless persons) 
regularly residing in their territory to compulsory military service and to other personal 
 
11 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Doc. E/AC.32/2 (1950), p. 8. 
12 The travaux préparatoires of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons, held in Geneva 2–25 July 1951, were preceded, a year before, by meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee 
on Statelessness and Related Problems and the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons 
(ECOSOC). The meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems took place in New 
York between 16 January and 16 February 1950; the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and 
Stateless Persons took place in Geneva on 14–25 August 1950. 
13 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Doc. E/AC.32/2 (1950), p. 11. 
14 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Doc. E/AC.32/2 Annex (1950), p. 31. 
services (labour service, national service, requisitions in the event of public emergency etc.) in 
the same manner as nationals.15 
6 Two points are worth highlighting here. First, the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Statelessness and Related Problems felt that it was necessary, or at least desirable, to regulate 
the general obligations of refugees specifically in the new convention. To this end, it was 
thought draft Art. 10 would constitute ‘a reminder of the essential duties common to nationals 
as well as to foreigners in general’.16 Secondly, general obligations were meant to apply to 
refugees and stateless persons ‘authorised to reside in a country’, as a counterpoint to the 
rights they were granted. To be sure, Art. 2 was meant to apply to refugees as lawful 
members of a society. 
7 Following a month of discussions among State delegates (Ad Hoc Committee 
on Statelessness and Related Problems, New York 16 January–16 February 1950), Chapter 
IV was stripped of its provision on military service,17 and its provision on fiscal charges was 
moved to a separate chapter on administrative measures,18 leaving draft Art. 10 as the key 
provision on the responsibilities and obligations of refugees. Quite significantly, this 
provision was inserted at the outset of the 1951 Convention (Art. 2), straight after Art. 1, 
before any provision on non-discrimination and rights.19 The Ad Hoc Committee on 
Statelessness and Related Problems agreed that this provision was ‘axiomatic and need not be 
 
15 Ibid., p. 32. 
16 Ibid., p. 31. 
17 The Committee felt that a provision relating to military service ‘might be open to misinterpretation and that 
this problem is covered by general rules of international law and practice’, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness 
and Related Problems, UN Docs. E/1618 and E/AC.32/5 (1950), p. 36; Weis observed that ‘by deleting Article 
12 the Committee has altered the structure of the draft convention, which was meant to cover the liabilities as 
well as the rights of refugees’, statement of Weis (IRO), Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related 
Problems, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.12 (1950), p. 10. 
18 For further details cf. Nagy on Art. 29 MN 7–9. 
19 Israel had first suggested that the ‘French conception of the draft convention as a proclamation of the rights 
and duties of refugees might be met by a general statement in the preamble’, Ad Hoc Committee on 
Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Doc.E/AC.32/SR.12 (1950), p. 7. However, the US was of the view 
that the provision on the obligations of refugees (in draft Art. 10) should apply to the whole of the draft 
convention and suggested that it be inserted towards the end of the document. In February 1950, Israel presented 
a proposal for a systematic rearrangement of the chapters and articles of the draft 1951 Convention. For the sake 
of convenience (when the refugee consults the 1951 Convention), the provision on general obligations was 
inserted in Chapter I on general provisions, in Art. 2. 
explicitly stated’.20 Nonetheless, it was felt that such provision would be useful ‘in order to 
produce a more balanced document as well as for its psychological effect on refugees and on 
countries considering admitting refugees’.21 In the words of Robinson (Israel), ‘the refugee 
thus obtained certain privileges and it was only fair to balance those by conferring upon him 
greater responsibilities’.22 
8 France, which already met heavy responsibilities in the refugee field, also 
suggested a second paragraph to Art. 2 with the effect of permitting States to restrict the 
political activities of refugees. Belgium observed that ‘it had been the experience of some 
States that foreign nationals rarely engaged in political activity, while refugees frequently did 
so’.23 Such political activities could threaten the security interests of the State granting 
asylum. However, the provision in question was rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Statelessness and Related Problems on the ground that it ‘was too broad, and might be 
misconstrued as constituting approval of limitations on areas of activity for refugees which 
are in themselves unobjectionable’.24 
9 Instead, the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems re-
affirmed the right, already existing in customary international law, of every sovereign 
 
20 Cf. e.g. the views of Denmark and Brazil. Denmark was arguing that the provision was ‘unnecessary’ and 
should not be included as a matter of principle because it was ‘superfluous’. Indeed, ‘it was generally known 
that the laws of a country applied not only to its nationals but also to the foreigners residing in its territory, 
whether they were refugees or not’, Statement of Larsen (Denmark), Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and 
Related Problems, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.11 (1950), p. 10; cf. also Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and 
Related Problems, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.23 (1950), p. 9. Brazil too thought that the article was ‘unnecessary’, 
and that there was no reason, ‘even psychological’, for this provision to be included in the draft convention. 
Indeed, ‘it was generally admitted in international law that the jurisdiction of a country applied to all residents, 
national or foreigners’, statement of Guerreiro (Brazil), Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related 
Problems, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.11 (1950), p. 10. Cf. also Hathaway, Rights, pp. 88–89. 
21 Statement of Robinson (Israel), Conference of Plenipotentiaries, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3 (1951), p. 21 and 
Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Docs. E/1618 and E/AC.32/5 (1950), pp. 40–
41; cf. also Robinson, Commentary, p. 71. 
22 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR. 12 (1950), p. 7. 
23 Statement of Cuvelier (Belgium), Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Doc. 
E/AC.32/SR.23 (1950), p. 11. 
24 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Docs. E/1618 and E/AC.32/5 (1950), p. 41. 
Cf. in particular the views of the US. The Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems further 
stressed that ‘the failure to include such provision is not to be interpreted as derogating from the power of 
governments in this respect’, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Doc. 
E/AC.32/L.32/Add.1 (1950), p. 2. 
government to limit the political activities of aliens, including of refugees,25 and agreed that 
in the most severe cases this could include expulsion.26 Nevertheless, in an effort to meet ‘at 
least in part’ the views of the French representative, the phrase ‘including measures for the 
maintenance of public order’ was included.27 Hence, some commentators have argued that 
the reference to ‘public order’ in Art. 2 confirms the country of asylum’s entitlement to 
restrict the political activities of refugees ‘where this is necessary to protect the vital interests 
of the State’.28 According to Hathaway, this is a misunderstanding of Art. 2 drafting history; 
refugees must conform to the laws and general regulations of the country of their residence 
but they are not subject to limitations on their political activity in the interest of the country’s 
public order beyond those already applicable to aliens or nationals of the country of asylum.29 
Further details are discussed below.30 
10 It follows from the discussion above that by the end of the first set of meetings 
(i.e. 16 February 1950), the provision on the general obligations of refugees read as follows: 
Article 2—General obligations 
In any country in which a refugee finds himself he must conform to the laws and regulations, 
including measures taken for the maintenance of public order.31 
11 France remained unsatisfied with the wording and substance of the 
compromise draft Art. 2, which it described as ‘a bad translation from the English’, urging 
the delegates to consider instead the wording of Art. 29, para. 1 UDHR: ‘Everyone has duties 
 
25 Statement of Perez Perozo (Venezuela), Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Doc. 
E/AC.32/SR.23 (1950), p. 11. 
26 Statement of Cha (China), Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Doc. 
E/AC.32/SR.23 (1950), p. 10; cf. also ‘Centuries ago, Grotius and Vattel considered it a duty of sovereigns not 
to permit their subjects (including persons who had found refuge in their territories) to offend foreign Powers’, 
Grahl-Madsen, JPR 3 (1966), pp. 278, 285. 
27 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Docs. E/1618 and E/AC.32/5 (1950), p. 41. 
Such compromise would accommodate France but also China, Belgium, Turkey, and Venezuela, Ad Hoc 
Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.23 (1950), pp. 10–11. 
28 Mandal, UNHCR PPLA/2003/04 (2003), p. 1; cf. also Robinson, Commentary, p. 72; Weis, Refugee, p. 38; 
Johnsson, IJRL 3 (1991), pp. 579, 582. 
29 Hathaway, Rights, p. 101 (fn. 84); cf. also Grahl-Madsen, Commentary, Art. 2 (paras. 4 and 6). 
30 Cf. infra, MN 29–45. 
31 Text of the draft 1951 Convention adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 
UN Docs. E/1618 and E/AC.32/5 (1950), p. 13. 
to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is 
possible.’32 
12 Further discussion therefore took place during the second set of meetings 
(Geneva 14–25 August 1950). Represented by Rochefort, the view of the French government 
was that, as it stood, Art. 2 was nothing more than a ‘declaration’ and he was requesting that 
at least it contains a ‘moral per contra’ that would prescribe certain duties for refugees.33 
13 Crucially, Rochefort proposed a text that aimed not to ‘bring about the forcible 
absorption of refugees into the community, but to ensure that their conduct and behaviour 
was in keeping with the advantages granted them by the country of asylum’.34 In other words, 
whereas the effect of most articles of the draft convention was to assimilate refugees and 
other aliens, the effect of Art. 2 was to ensure that refugees would not constitute a problem 
through non-conformity to the laws and regulations to which they were subject (thereby 
prohibiting behaviour that could lead to xenophobic attitudes). France therefore was 
suggesting the following text, based on Art. 29, para. 1 UDHR: 
Article 2—General Obligations 
The duties of the refugee towards the community shall include the obligation to conform to all 
measures taken for the maintenance of public order, and also to the laws and regulations of the 
country in which he finds himself.35 
14 Following some disagreement on the meaning of ‘community’, it was agreed 
that the text suggested by France should be sent to the Drafting Committee for further 
consideration, and no further decision was taken by the time discussions at the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons came to an end on 25 August 1950.36 
 
32 Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, UN Doc. E/AC.32/L.40 (1950), p. 31. 
33 Indeed, among the various European countries represented at the Committee, ‘France had the onerous 
privilege of being the country with greatest responsibilities in the refugee field, and the one that was most 
exposed’, Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.33 (1950), p. 6. 
34 Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.34 (1950), p. 4. 
35 Ibid., p. 4. 
36 Ibid., p. 8. 
15 A revised Art. 2 of the draft 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees was 
presented to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries (Geneva, July 1951) for final discussion and 
adoption. It read: ‘Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which 
require in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken 
for the maintenance of public order.’37 
Three amendments were introduced (by Australia, Belgium, and France),38 and 
withdrawn, and the text of Art. 2, as stated above, was adopted unanimously on 24 July 
1951.39 
16 To summarize, Art. 2 has no precedent in previous refugee conventions. It 
constitutes the first provision to refer to the duties of refugees in the context of an 
international status. Its wording is based on Art. 29 UDHR. It provides a moral rule of a 
general nature, not punitive in character, that is to say ‘an imperfect obligation’.40 It was 
designed to minimize conduct that could spark xenophobic attitudes; a concern recently 
reaffirmed in paragraph 39 of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants where 
the obligations of refugees and migrants are mentioned in the context of ensuring their 
integration and inclusion, combatting xenophobia, racism and discrimination, and reducing 
the risks of marginalization and radicalization.41It was decided quite early on that a provision 
on the general obligations of refugees should exclude from its scope matters relating to 
military service and the political (subversive) activities of refugees because any such 
 
37 Conference of Plenipotentiaries, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/1 (1951), p. 6. 
38 The French amendment provided the possibility for States to sanction refugees who fail to observe their duties 
under Art. 2 and who constituted a danger to the internal and external security of the country of asylum, by 
forfeiting their rights under the 1951 Convention. It was agreed that any such activity should be dealt with under 
the provision of the draft 1951 Convention relating to non-refoulement (‘prohibition of expulsion or return’). 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.4 (1951), pp. 4–13 and Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.24 (1951), p. 19. 
39 Conference of Plenipotentiaries, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.33 (1951), p. 7. 
40 Grahl-Madsen, Commentary, Art. 2 (para. 3). 
41 Noteworthy is the silence of the Global Compact on Refugees on anything remotely amounting to ‘duties of 
refugees’: ’98. Local integration is a dynamic and two-way process, which requires efforts by all parties, 
including a preparedness on the part of refugees to adapt to the host society, and a corresponding readiness on 
the part of the host communities and public institutions to welcome refugees and to meet the needs of a diverse 
population’ (emphasis added). 
reference ran the risk of being misinterpreted or misconstrued. Whilst this remains the case 
regarding military service, the prohibition of political activities of refugees has become 
increasingly regulated by regional treaties of refugee law and treaties of human rights law.42 
C. Declarations and Reservations Made with Regard to Article 2 
17 To date, none of the contracting parties has entered a declaration or reservation with 
regard to Art. 2.43 
D. Interrelationship of Article 2 with Other Provisions 
18 Article 2 forms part of Chapter I on ‘General Provisions’. It was inserted in the 1951 
Convention straight after Art.1 on the definition of the term ‘refugee’, before any provision 
on discrimination and rights. Hence, Art. 2 has been described as ‘a qualifying clause to 
Article 1’.44 Its non-observance does not have any effect in international law (although it may 
in national law); it does not entail the loss of refugee status or any particular right under the 
1951 Convention. Rather if and when refugees fail to comply with their duties and by doing 
so constitute a danger to the security of the country of refuge or to the community of that 
country, or a threat to national security or public order, the limitations provided in the 1951 
Convention may be used by States.45 Art. 2’s close relationship with other provisions of the 
1951 Convention (such as Arts. 28, 31, 32, and 33, para. 2) is therefore evident.46 Art. 2 has 
also been described as a ‘corresponding obligation’ on refugees in exchange for the absolute 
 
42 Cf. infra, MN 20–28. 
43 Cf. Declarations and Reservations to the 1951 Convention, available at 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V~2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2
&lang=en>. 
44 Statement of Robinson (Israel), Conference of Plenipotentiaries, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3 (1951), p. 21: ‘It 
was psychologically advantageous for a refugee, on consulting the Convention, to note his obligations towards 
his host country. Article 2 was therefore a qualifying clause to Article 1.’ 
45 Hathaway, Rights, pp. 106, 685–686; cf. also McNamara, D., ‘The 1951 Convention and International 
Protection’, statement made at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1999), pp. 3–4, available at 
<http://www.unhcr.org/admin/ADMIN/42b80f052.html>; Feller, IJRL 18 (2006), pp. 509, 520: ‘Nothing in the 
Convention provides license to refugees to commit crimes’. 
46 For further details cf. also Vedsted-Hansen on Art. 28 MN 70–73, passim; Noll on Art. 31 MN 27, 68–87; 88–
127, passim; Davy on Art. 32 MN 62–78, passim; Zimmermann/Wennholz on Art. 33, para. 2 MN 72–99, 
passim. 
right of access to the courts under Art. 16, para. 1.47 The same could be said about Art. 34 
requiring that: ‘The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and 
naturalization of refugees.’48 
Given the context described above, the question arises whether Art. 2 imposes an obligation 
on individuals seeking refugee protection to tell the truth when applying for refugee status. 
Few academics have engaged with this issue. From the outset, it should be noted that the 
1951 Convention is silent on matters of procedures. Bearing this in mind, Gibney finds it 
ethically tricky to read ‘an implicit legal duty to cooperate with refugee status determination 
procedures’ in Art. 2.49 He further argues that since refugees flee out of necessity, ‘they are 
under no legal duty to respect the immigration laws of a state to the extent that these laws 
prevent them from escaping persecution or human rights violations’.50 In a similar vein, 
Blake notes that the link between the obligation to obey and the right to morally condemn the 
individual who fails in this obligation cannot always be made out, thereby defending the idea 
that security at the border and compassion for those who evaded that security may not always 
be consistent.51 The legal reality is that ‘a clear verdict on the truthfulness of an applicant’s 
testimony’ is often difficult to reach.52 Indeed, it is not uncommon for decision makers to 
doubt the truth of an individual’s story and still be persuaded that a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted exists.53 Piotrowicz, no doubt influenced by Grahl-Madsen’s writing,54 
posits that asylum seekers have a duty to be truthful with the State when applying for asylum; 
he locates the source of this obligation in the UNHCR Refugee Handbook and Art. 2 of the 
 
47 UNHCR, Inquiry into the Migration Litigation Reform Bill (2005), para. 5, available at 
<http://www.unhcr.org.au/pdfs/MigLitRef05.pdf>. For further details cf. Elberling on Art. 16 MN 23. 
48 For further details cf. Marx on Art. 34 MN 39–48. 
49 Gibney, The Duties, p.137. 
50 Ibid, p.134 and p.138. 
51 Blake, Justice, pp.168-172.  
52 Hathaway/Foster, Status, p.149. 
53 Symes/Jorro, Asylum, p.60. 
54 Grahl-Madsen, Status, p.252: ‘The principle of good faith implies that a Contracting State cannot be bound to 
grant refugee status to a person who is not a bona fide refugee …’. 
1951 Convention. 55 Piotrowicz nevertheless acknowledges the limits of this duty in 
international law by reference to Articles 1C, 1F, 31 and 33 of the 1951 Convention and 
agrees that whilst asylum seekers may be the subject of criminal proceedings, they may not 
be deprived of the protection of the 1951 Convention for lying during an interview.56  
The most compelling argument against subjecting asylum seekers to a principle of good faith 
is made by Goodwin-Gill: ‘The so-called good faith requirement seems to offer an attractive 
and self-justifying response to the asylum seeker who is trying to manipulate the process. 
However, it has no legal authority. … There is thus no authority for the proposition that the 
Convention was ‘intended to afford protection only to the bona fide individual’’.57 For 
Goodwin-Gill, a requirement of good faith is largely unnecessary because evidence relating 
to the country of origin will determine whether a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
exists.58 
In sum, there is no obligation in international law for individuals (as opposed to States) to act 
in good faith and Art. 2 of the 1951 Convention therefore cannot be read to include such 
obligation. 
E. Other Relevant Norms of International Law Relating to 
Political (Subversive) Activities of Refugees 
19 Today, the 1951 Convention is not the only international treaty to provide certain 
duties for refugees and people in general. The general principle in Art. 2, according to which 
 
55 Piotrowicz, IJMGR 20 (2013), pp.268-69. 
56 Piotrowicz is further uncertain as to what States should do with asylum seekers who mislead or lie but who 
nevertheless have a legitimate claim to international protection (ibid, p.271). 
57 Goodwin-Gill, IJRL 12 (2000), pp. 670-671.  
58 Ibid, pp. 663–671, passim; cf. also Towle, R. ‘The Principle of Good Faith in Contemporary Refugee Law and 
Practice’, LLM Essay submitted to the University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 28 June 
1996 (unpublished, on file with the author); UNHCR Handbook on Procedures (1979), para. 42; UNHCR 
Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons (2014), para.107. 
‘[e]very refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in 
particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for the 
maintenance of public order’, was re-affirmed in other instruments of refugee law, with some 
nuances regarding the subversive activities of refugees. Several treaties of human rights law 
also make reference to certain duties owed by individuals to ‘the community’ or ‘society’, as 
well as to each other. 
I. Regional Treaties of Refugee Law and the UNHCR’s Soft Law 
20 The OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
(OAU Refugee Convention) goes considerably further than the 1951 Convention on the 
subject of the duties of refugees.59 In an effort to minimize tension between OAU States as a 
result of refugee problems, the Heads of States and Governments decided to impose an 
obligation on refugees not to undertake subversive activities in their host country.60 The risk 
of a provision requiring that a refugee ‘shall also abstain from any subversive activities 
against any Member State of the OAU’ (Art. 3, para. 1) is that it may be used by some States 
‘to prohibit all political activity connected to the refugee’s country of origin, or in certain 
cases, any political activity at all’.61 This would in turn seriously compromise States’ 
compliance with certain civil and political rights, including freedom of expression, protected 
in international human rights treaties, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR).62 As discussed above, this is a risk the drafters of Art. 2 of the 1951 Convention 
were not ready to take.63 
 
59 For further details cf. van Garderen/Ebenstein, Regional Developments: Africa MN 11–45, passim. 
60 Art. 3 (Prohibition of Subversive Activities) OAU Refugee Convention, para.1. 
61 da Costa, UNHCR POLAS/2006/02 (2006), p. 170. For further details cf. van Garderen/Ebenstein, Regional 
Developments: Africa MN 32–38. 
62 da Costa, UNHCR POLAS/2006/02 (2006), p. 170. For further details cf. van Garderen/Ebenstein, Regional 
Developments: Africa MN 36 and 74–77. 
63 Cf. supra, MN 7 et seq. 
21 The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Cartagena Declaration)64 also 
acknowledges States’ commitments ‘to prevent the participation of refugees in activities 
directed against the country of origin, while at all times respecting the human rights of the 
refugees’.65 It further confirms the friendliness, ‘peaceful, non-political and exclusively 
humanitarian nature of grant of asylum or recognition of the status of refugee’.66 
22 The UNHCR too has recommended that asylum seekers should not become 
involved in subversive activities against their country of origin or any other State.67 
Furthermore, it has recommended that refugees in camps and settlements have duties deriving 
from the protection afforded to them by the country of refuge. In particular, they have duties 
to conform to the laws and regulations of the State of refuge, including lawful measures taken 
for the maintenance of public order, and to abstain from any activity likely to detract from the 
exclusively civilian and humanitarian character of the camps and settlements.68 As will be 
discussed below, the legislation of several African States makes provision for the host State 
to ensure that asylum seekers and refugees do not use their new country of refuge to launch 
attacks against their country of origin or any other country.69 
23 In sum, these regional instruments show that provisions restricting the political 
activities of refugees are now embedded in refugee treaties in Africa and Central America 
(including Mexico and Panama). Similar restrictions also exist in the UNHCR’s soft law 
instruments.  
II. Human Rights Law 
 
64 Cf. also the International Conference on Central American Refugees in which States confirmed the obligation 
of refugees to avoid any activities which might affect the strictly civilian and humanitarian nature of camps and 
settlements, ‘as well as any activity that is incompatible with the regional peace process’, International 
Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA), UN Doc. CIREFCA/89/14 (1989), p. 3, referred to in 
Johnsson, IJRL 3 (1991), pp. 579, 582. For further details cf. Piovesan/Jubilut, Regional Developments: 
Americas MN 48–60. 
65 Part II (p) Cartagena Declaration. 
66 Part III, para. 4 Cartagena Declaration. 
67 UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 22 (1981). 
68 UNHCR ExCom, No. 48 (1988), no. 4 (a). 
69 Cf. infra, MN 32; Maina, JAL 41 (1997), pp. 81, 85, 87. 
24 Several instruments of human rights law make reference to certain duties owed by 
individuals to ‘the community’ or ‘society’, as well as to each other. Article 29 UDHR, for 
instance, reads: ‘Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible.’70 The spirit of this provision found its place in 
Recital 5 of the Preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR): ‘Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the 
community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and 
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.’71 
25 The Declaration on Territorial Asylum expressly provides in Art. 4 that: 
‘States granting asylum shall not permit persons who have received asylum to engage in 
activities contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’72 Under the 1951 
Convention, any such activities would lead to exclusion from refugee status under Art. 1 F 
(c).73 Art. 34 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families also provides for the obligation of migrant workers 
to comply with the laws and regulations of any State of transit and the State of employment, 
and the obligation to respect the cultural identity of the inhabitants of such States.74 
26 At a regional level, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
strongly emphasizes the duties of individuals in the Americas; five out of the six recitals in its 
Preamble and an entire Chapter in the main text of the Declaration (Chapter 2, Arts. 29 to 38) 
are devoted to such duties. The ACHPR also contains specific provisions relating to each 
individual’s ‘duties towards his family and society, the State and other legally recognised 
 
70 Art. 29, para. 1 UDHR. 
71 Cf. also Art. 18 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to 
Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
72 For further details cf. Skordas on Art. 5 MN 38. 
73 For further details cf. Zimmermann/Wennholz on Art. 1 F MN 83–101, passim. 
74 Noteworthy is the phrase ‘State of transit’ contrasting sharply with the wording of Art. 2 of the 1951 
Convention and other provisions of human rights law which assume a correlation between duties and 
membership/belonging into the new State. See generally, though not on this particular point, IOM Global 
Compact Thematic Paper, ‘The Responsibilities and Obligations of Migrants Towards Host Countries’, pp.1-5. 
communities and the international community’ (Art. 27). It further recognizes in Art. 28 the 
duty of every individual ‘to respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination, 
and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect 
and tolerance’. In addition, it provides a full list of individuals’ duties, such as Art. 29, para 3: 
‘Not to compromise the security of the State whose national or resident he is.’75 
27 In potential conflict with these provisions, other provisions of human rights 
treaties have come to provide a new and higher set of international standards against which to 
measure States’ treatment of aliens, including refugees. In particular, the principle of non-
discrimination between nationals and aliens imposes strict limitations upon the freedom of 
States to deal with aliens.76 So does the right to freedom of expression.77 This freedom is 
nonetheless subject to certain limitations as provided by law, and as necessary to ensure the 
respect of the rights or reputation of others, or the protection of national security, public 
order, health, or morals. Furthermore, the right to freedom of expression may also be limited 
on grounds of ‘propaganda for war’ or ‘advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’ (e.g. Art. 20 ICCPR). Article 
16 ECHR stands out among all these provisions because it makes a distinction between 
nationals and aliens concerning freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association, and freedom from discrimination,78 and hence it provides a ‘notable [and highly 
contested] departure from the general guarantees entrenched in human rights law, including 
the ECHR itself’.79 
 
75 Cf. also Art. 31 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
76 Art. 2 ICCPR; CCPR, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004), pp. 140–142; Goodwin-Gill, IMR 23 (1989), pp. -526–546, 
passim; Lambert, Position, pp. 18–23. 
77 Guaranteed in Art. 19 ICCPR; Art. 7 Convention on Territorial Asylum; Art. 13 American Convention on 
Human Rights: ‘Pact of San José, Costa Rica’; Art. 9 ACHPR; and Art. 10 Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). This is also the case, for instance, for the right to freedom 
of assembly and freedom of association (e.g. Art. 11 ECHR). 
78 Art. 16 ECHR: ‘Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting 
Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.’ 
79 da Costa, UNHCR POLAS/2006/02 (2006), p. 174; cf. also Lambert, Position, pp. 25–26. 
28 In sum, international human rights law, like international refugee law, 
provides countries of refuge or asylum with the possibility of protecting the legitimate 
concerns of the country of origin as well as respecting the sovereignty of other States.80 Since 
Art. 2 of the 1951 Convention defines the general obligations of refugees by reference to the 
domestic law of the contracting parties (‘to its laws and regulations as well as to measures 
taken for the maintenance of public order’), it is to the practice of domestic courts, 
administration, and legislation that this commentary now turns. 
F. Analysis 
29 It is apparent from the drafting history above81 that not every word in Art. 2 was the 
subject of debate. The term ‘refugee’, for instance, is used simply to mean a refugee who is 
benefiting from the protection of the 1951 Convention, namely a refugee under Art. 1. The 
phrase ‘to the country in which he finds himself’ is meant to include any country where a 
refugee is staying lawfully, and not just the country where he is physically present.82 The 
phrase ‘which require in particular’ suggests that refugees may have other duties towards 
their country of refuge but there is no indication in the travaux préparatoires as to what these 
duties might be.83 However, the debate that took place during the drafting of Art. 2 over the 
phrases ‘has duties’ and ‘that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures 
taken for the maintenance of public order’, the essence of which is captured above, has 
continued to occupy domestic courts.84 It is generally understood that the words ‘has duties’ 
refer to an imperfect obligation, not punitive in character, so that the non-observance of a 
duty covered by Art. 2 has no effect in international law. It is also generally agreed that the 
 
80 Art. 32 of the 1951 Convention; Arts. 4, 19, para. 3, 20, para. 1, 21, and 22, para. 2 ICCPR; Art. 3 OAU 
Refugee Convention; Arts. 23, para. 2 and 29, para. 3 ACHPR. 
81 Cf. supra, MN 4–16. 
82 Grahl-Madsen, Commentary, Art. 2 (para. 4); but cf. also Goodwin-Gill/McAdam, Refugee, p. 524. For 
further details cf. Walter on Art. 4 MN 20–21; Edwards on Art. 18 MN 10–15; Teichmann on Art. 15 MN 45–
50. 
83 Grahl-Madsen, Commentary, Art. 2 (para. 5). 
84 Cf. supra, MN 4–16. 
expression ‘public order’ in Art. 2 is to be understood to mean ‘ordre public’ within the 
French meaning of the term, i.e. it covers approximately the same ground as ‘national 
security’ in Arts. 32 and 33.85 
30 The following section looks at national legislation, court decisions, and 
administrative practice incorporating or simply referring in some way to Art. 2 of the 1951 
Convention. As will become apparent, whilst Art. 2 is reflected in some national legislation, 
with rare exceptions, it is not to be found in jurisprudence and administrative practice. 
I. Legislation 
31 Very few countries, outside Africa, have adopted legislative provisions that could 
even come close to resembling Art. 2 (e.g. Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Belize).86 In some 
countries, the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol may not even be signed and the concept 
of ‘refugee’ remains unrecognized (e.g. India).87 
32 The situation is different in Africa where the legislation of several countries 
refers in some way or another to the rights and general duties of refugees (e.g. in Kenya, art. 
16, para. 1 of the Refugee Act 2006; in South Africa, art. 34 of the Refugees Act 1998; in 
Ghana, art. 11 of the Refugee Law 1992; in Sierra Leone, arts. 15 and 18 of the Refugees 
 
85 Cf. Grahl-Madsen, Commentary, Art. 2 (para. 8); Robinson, Commentary, p. 72; Hathaway, Rights, p. 702. 
For further details cf. also Davy on Art. 32 MN 67–74 and Zimmermann/Wennholz on Art. 33, para. 2 MN 82–
89. 
86 Art. 5 Bulgarian Law for Asylum and Refugees, Prom. SG. 54 (2002), amended SG. 31 (2005): ‘The 
foreigners seeking and having received protection in the Republic of Bulgaria shall have the rights and the 
obligations according to this law and shall bear civil, administrative and penal responsibility under the 
conditions and by the order valid for the Bulgarian citizens’. Sec. 26 of the Cyprus Refugees Ordinance of 2003 
(Ordinance of 31 March 2003 giving effect to a memorandum of understanding between the UK and Cyprus 
Governments concerning the areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia) according to which a refugee must comply with the 
law of these areas, must not engage in activities which may endanger the security of these areas, harm the public 
interest or disrupt public order, or engage in activities contrary to the principles of the UN. Sec. 13 Belize 
Refugees Act—Chapter 165 of the Substantive Laws of Belize—revised edition 2000, provides that ‘every 
recognized refugee within Belize shall be entitled to the rights and be subject to the duties contained in the 
[1951] Convention . . . ; shall be subject to all laws in force within Belize; and shall be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to work and contribute to the development of Belize’. 
87 Ananthachari, ISIL Yearbook of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law (2001), passim, available at 
<http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/ISILYBIHRL/2001/7.html>. 
Protection Act 2007; and in Tanzania, art. 10 of the Refugees (Control) Act 1996).88This 
emphasis on the rights and duties of refugees in a number of African States is clearly the 
result of a greater emphasis on obligations and duties of the individual towards the 
community and the State in African refugee and human rights instruments generally (e.g. Art. 
3 of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention).89 
33 In Europe, concern (at least on paper) seems to be more on ensuring that 
adequate protection is provided and the rights of refugees sufficiently guaranteed. Such 
concern is reflected in the general lack of anything resembling Art. 2 in domestic 
legislation.90 However, during the last twenty years, EU Member States have adopted a 
number of directives and regulations aimed at establishing a common European asylum 
system based on the full and inclusive application of the 1951 Convention.91 Although none 
of these new measures embraces the exact wording of Art. 2, a few provide explicit duties for 
refugees, asylum seekers, and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. 
34 The recast Qualification Directive refers in passim to the ‘rights and 
obligations’ of refugees in a few places, e.g. Recital (47), Arts. 12, para. 1 (b) and 22.92 It also 
contains provisions relating to specific duties. For instance, Art. 4, para. 1 provides that it is 
the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all elements needed to substantiate the 
application for international protection. Article 14, para. 3 (b) of the Qualification Directive 
sanctions misrepresentation or omission of facts, including the use of false documents, which 
 
88 The Refugees Act 130 of the South African Republic is currently being amended and new art. 34 of the 
Refugees Amendment Bill (4 March 2008) refers not only to the obligations of refugees to abide by the laws of 
the Republic but also to the obligation to inform the necessary authorities of any residential address and changes 
to that address. Such obligations would be applicable to refugees as well as asylum seekers, and a new heading 
on ‘The Rights and Obligations of Refugees and Asylum Seekers’ is being suggested (secs. 20, 27 and 28 
Refugees Amendment Bill). Cf. also Maina, JAL 41 (1997), pp. 81, 85, 87. Cf. also van Garderen/Ebenstein, 
Regional Developments: Africa MN 46–73. 
89 For further details cf. also supra, MN 19. 
90 But also in the jurisprudence cf. infra, MN 37–43. 
91 For further details cf. Klug, Regional Developments: Europe MN 33–74; McAdam, Interpretation MN 98–99; 
cf. also Hofmann/Löhr, Introduction to Chapter V MN 16–32; Zimmermann/Mahler on Art. 1 A, para. 2 MN 
110–112; Kälin/Caroni/Heim on Art. 33, para. 1 MN 40–45. 
92 Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011, OJ L 337, 9; Lambert, ICLQ 55 (2006), pp. 161–192, passim. 
were decisive for the granting of refugee status with the revocation of, ending of, or refusal to 
renew refugee status.93 The Directive is nevertheless silent on what penalties may apply for 
failing to comply with such procedural requirements, preferring instead to leave it to the 
Member States to decide. Further, Art. 4, para. 3 (d) provides that ‘the applicant’s activities 
since leaving the country of origin engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating’ a 
well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm must be assessed against the applicant’s risk 
of persecution or serious harm if returned to that country. And according to Art. 5, para. 2 
genuine fear or real risk may also exist based on activities which the applicant has engaged in 
since they left the country of origin, particularly if these activities ‘constitute the expression 
and continuation of convictions or orientations held in the country of origin’. Hence, the 
recast Qualification Directive does not equivocally require asylum seekers to act in good 
faith. 
35 The Procedures Directive94, although not directly a matter of international law, 
also provides for certain obligations of asylum seekers. According to Art. 13 of the 
Procedures Directive, the Member States may require from asylum seekers that they 
‘cooperate with the competent authorities insofar as these obligations are necessary for the 
processing of the application’; in particular they may be required to report to the competent 
authorities or to appear in person before them, to hand over relevant documents, to inform the 
competent authorities of their current place of residence/address or of any changes.95 The 
Procedures Directive further allows accelerated procedures to be used in cases where the 
 
93 Cf. also Art. 19, para. 3 (b) Qualification Directive concerning beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. 
94 Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013, OJ L 180, 60. For further details cf. also Hofmann/Löhr, Introduction 
to Chapter V MN18–32. 
95 Cf. e.g. reference in the Irish Refugee Act No.17/1996, sec. 11, para. 8 (e), (f), to the duty of the applicant for 
asylum/refugee status to cooperate with the competent asylum authorities, to furnish all relevant information to 
their applications, and the obligation of the applicant to notify the authority of their address in the host country. 
Cf. also Cyprus Refugees Ordinance (2003), sec. 18, supra, fn. 75. 
applicant has failed to fulfil his obligations.96 The Procedures Directive therefore provides a 
list of procedural rules with which any applicant for asylum must comply, failing which they 
will be sanctioned; their application may be considered through an accelerated procedure or 
may simply be declared inadmissible.97 
36 It is clear from our analysis of the drafting history of Art. 2 of the 1951 
Convention above that some of the provisions (i.e. European ones) are quite distinct from the 
scope and the purely moral and non-punitive character of Art. 2 and cannot therefore be 
based on Art. 2. Such provisions are also difficult to reconcile with the fact that there is no 
obligation in international law for individuals to act in good faith. In the case of the EU, it 
will take some time for the CJEU to develop an authoritative interpretation of the provisions 
relating to the duties of refugees and asylum seekers due to the existing limitations of Art. 
267 TFEU.98 
II. Jurisprudence 
37 Jurisprudence relating to Art. 2 is hard to find. Scarce are decisions examining Art. 2 
specifically as opposed to related provisions; this is likely due to the character of Art. 2 as ‘an 
imperfect obligation’.99  
On rare occasions, Art. 2 has been used by courts to justify acts going beyond the 
scope of Art. 2 and the overall humanitarian purpose of the 1951 Convention. For instance, 
the New Zealand Immigration Service cited Art. 2 ‘as justification for the refusal to grant 
 
96 Art. 31, para. 8  Procedures Directive. E.g., if he or she has misled the authorities, filed another application 
giving other personal data, has acted in bad faith (such as destroyed travel or ID documents), entered the 
territory unlawfully or is an overstayer, refuses to have his or her fingerprints taken, etc. 
97 Cf. also the Reception Directive (Directive 2013/33/EU of 26 June 2013, OJ L 180, 96) allowing asylum 
seekers certain rights, such as residence and freedom of movement, to be severely limited for reasons of public 
interest, public order, or ‘when necessary for the swift processing and effective monitoring of his or her 
application’. Furthermore, sanctions are provided in numerous cases where an asylum seeker fails to abide by 
certain rules (such as failure to comply with reporting duties or failure to apply for asylum as soon as reasonably 
practical after arrival). 
98 Lambert, ICLQ 58 (2009), p. 524. 
99 Hence, it is not to be found in some of those countries that otherwise have well developed jurisprudence on 
the 1951 Convention: e.g. Austria, France, Germany, and South Africa. 
permits to asylum seekers who, while holding a visitor permit only, undertake employment in 
breach of the terms of that permit’.100 In Canada, three cases were found where Art. 2 was 
cited and discussed, albeit obiter. All three seem to be interpreting Art. 2 as imposing an 
implied obligation akin to a duty of good faith for refugees in international law. 
38 In R. v. Arunasalam, the Quebec Sessions of the Peace found that an applicant 
who had entered Canada illegally using a false passport and who further knowingly made a 
false statement was found to have committed a criminal offence under Canadian law (1976 
Immigration Act).101 The judge rejected the application of the 1951 Convention to the case 
because no legislation had been passed to sanction the relevant treaty provisions (in particular 
Art. 2) and the treaty could not be considered a peace treaty.102 However, consideration of the 
1951 Convention was made obiter dicta. The judge in this case distinguished between Art. 31 
(applicable to the applicant’s behaviour just after his arrival in Canada)103 and Art. 2 of the 
1951 Convention (applicable to the applicant during the subsequent weeks and more 
particularly during the immigration inquiry). And he found that if the 1951 Convention had 
been applicable, the accused’s behaviour after his arrival at the International Airport in 
Canada (i.e. travelling with a false passport) could be protected from prosecution under Art. 
31. However, the accused’s behaviour during the following weeks of the immigration inquiry 
(i.e. the continued use of a false identity) could not be protected against prosecution in view 
of Art. 2. The judge considered the immigration inquiry to be a measure taken for the 
maintenance of public order, in that ‘immigration officers screen potential Canadian 
 
100 Refugee Status Appeal Authority (New Zealand), Refugee Appeal No. 391/92 Re CFK, 22 April 1994, quoted 
in Haines, JRS 7 (1994), pp. 260, 264. Note that in Australia, Art. 2 of the 1951 Convention has only been 
referred in passim in two cases: NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 6; and Chan v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62, 
(1989) 169 CLR 379. 
101 R. v. Arunasalam [1983] Carswell Que 382 (Canada). 
102 Ibid., para. 18. 
103 For further details cf. also Noll on Art. 31 MN 33–67. 
residents’.104 The fact that ‘the accused continued to identify himself falsely after the 
immigration officers had treated him in a most human manner’ was sufficient for the judge in 
this case to activate Art. 2 of the 1951 Convention. The reference to ‘public order’ in Art. 2 in 
this context creates confusion since the behaviour in question was found to be contrary to the 
criminal law of Canada—it was thus covered by the ‘laws and regulations’ in Art. 2. The 
reference to ‘after the immigration officers had treated him in a most human manner’ in the 
context of Art. 2 adds further confusion since as established above there exists no obligation 
in international law on the part of individuals (as opposed to States) to act in good faith. 
Rather the matter of deceit/bad faith is one to be considered under national law, in particular 
in the context of the credibility of the applicant.105 
39 Ten years later, in Dee v Canada,106 the appellant had been found to be a 1951 
Convention refugee. But again because the 1951 Convention per se was not part of Canadian 
law, refugees lawfully in Canada could be subject to deportation in cases listed under the 
Canadian immigration law. In this case, the appellant entered Canada as a visitor but failed to 
renew his visa when necessary. As a result, deportation could be ordered under national law. 
Once again, the court discussed obiter dicta the scenario ‘if the Refugee Convention was part 
of Canadian law’ and found that even in such cases, the provisions of the 1951 Convention 
(Arts. 2, 31, and 33) would not help him in establishing that he is in Canada lawfully. The 
court found that a 1951 Convention refugee has no general lawful right to be in Canada. Only 
a refugee who is lawfully in Canada has a right to remain. The court concluded: 
. . . the appellant’s past conduct shows a willful disregard for the welfare of his family and 
business associates . . . He was blinded by the opportunity for personal gain . . . the appellant 
was prepared to engage in unethical and immoral business practices. He was less than a 
credible witness on the material aspects of his case. All of this must necessarily impact 
 
104 Arunasalam, supra, fn. 92, para. 20. 
105 For further details cf. Hofmann/Löhr, Introduction to Chapter V, passim. 
106 Dee v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1994] Carswell Nat 2999 (Canada). 
negatively on his character. . . . I conclude that the appellant is undeserving of the exercise of 
the Appeal Division’s equitable jurisdiction in his favour. 
40 Such reasoning was again applied in Shirdon v. Canada.107 The applicant, ex-
ambassador in the former government of Somalia headed by President Siad Barre, was found 
to be a refugee under the 1951 Convention but was declared inadmissible to enter Canada as 
an immigrant by virtue of the Immigration Act 1985, on the ground that his admission would 
be detrimental to the national interest.108 In this case, the court referred to Art. 2 in support of 
the withdrawal of his right to remain in Canada under Canadian immigration law.109 It further 
denied the existence of compassionate or humanitarian considerations that would warrant 
special relief (e.g. a right to remain) on the ground that ‘national interest weighs heavily 
against granting special relief’ and ‘the appellant is not morally blameless’.110 
The High Court of Ireland likewise implied from Art. 2 an obligation on the part of 
asylum seekers to act in good faith when refusing leave to appeal to a married couple from 
Zimbabwe whose entire application for asylum had been fabricated. The High Court held that 
all applicants ‘have a duty when engaging in the asylum system to cooperate by presenting 
their account in a truthful manner’.111 These obligations are based on the terms of the Irish 
Refugee Act, which incorporates EU law; they arise from Art. 2 of the 1951 Convention.112 It 
may be noted that the same conclusion would likely have been reached by simply relying on 
the evidence relating to the country of origin.113 
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109 Note that the Court also referred to Art. 1 F (a) of the 1951 Convention but only passim as it considered the 
matter to be one to be decided under domestic immigration law. 
110 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Appeal Division, supra, fn. 98, pp. 16 and 17. 
111 C. & Anor -v- Refugee Applications Commissioner & Anor [2010] IEHC 490, para. 24. 
112 Ibid, paras. 24-86. 
113 As argued in Goodwin-Gill, IJRL 12 (2000), pp. 663-671, discussing Danian v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, UK IAT Appeal No. CC 30274/97 (16494), 28 May 1998, and in Refugee Status Appeal 
authority (New Zealand) Refugee Appeal No. 2254/94 Re HB. See also Refugee Status Appeal Authority (New 
41 A more faithful reading of Art. 2 was endorsed by the US Court of Appeals in 
Smriko v Ashcroft.114 Mr. Smriko had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States 
for less than five years when he committed three crimes of retail theft involving moral 
turpitude115 which, under domestic law, subjected him to deportation. However, he had been 
admitted to the United States with refugee status pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, implementing the Protocol to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which 
itself incorporated Arts. 2 to 34 of the 1951 Convention.116 The government argued that by 
‘voluntary choosing to adjust’ his status from refugee to lawful permanent resident, he had 
lost his refugee status and the protection of the Protocol. Smriko argued, in concert with the 
UNHCR, that obtaining lawful permanent resident status is not a basis for the cessation of 
refugee status under the 1951 Convention.117 Furthermore, he agreed that under the 1951 
Convention, refugees have certain duties but noted that ‘the violation of any criminal law is 
not, in and of itself, grounds for terminating refugee status under that agreement’.118 He 
recognized that: 
While he is liable for violating criminal laws in the same manner as a United States citizen 
would be . . . [nonetheless] Congress, in implementing the Protocol, intentionally limited the 
grounds for cancelling refugee status because it intended to give refugees heightened 
protection (as compared to other aliens) in light of the traumatic conditions they have fled.119 
42 The Court of Appeal ruled that Smriko presented a plausible reading of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, not directly contradicted by statutory text, regulations, or 
relevant precedent, and allowed his appeal. 
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114 Smriko v Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279 (US). 
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43 There are numerous other cases involving refugees where there have been severe 
breaches of domestic laws and regulations, or measures taken for the maintenance of public 
order. In such cases, national courts have referred rightly to Arts. 1 F, 31, 32, and 33, para. 2, 
and not to Art. 2. For instance, in Kenya, the High Court has been reluctant to entertain 
arguments based on Art. 2 of the 1951 Convention and Art. 3 of the 1969 Convention in 
order to limit refugees’ right of movement,120 confirming instead that ‘the State has legal 
options with refugees whom it deems to have engaged in conduct that is not in conformity 
with their status as refugees’, namely Articles 1C, 1F, 32 and 33.121 
III. Administrative Practice 
44 On rare occasion, States have limited the freedom of expression of refugees by 
imposing on them a duty or obligation of reserve (devoir de réserve). When this is the case, 
the obligation is aimed at the State of origin (to confirm the friendly and humanitarian nature 
of the right of asylum) as well as the State of asylum (to protect itself against possible 
tension, insurgencies, or xenophobic attacks within the country of asylum). France is the only 
widely known case of such administrative practice, which dates back more than a century and 
is still in use today.122 Notably, an administrative circular of 1974123 requested that refugees 
abstain from: (1) interfering in the internal affairs of France, (2) importing any violent 
political dispute from their country of origin, (3) constituting a threat to national security, and 
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(4) compromising France’s diplomatic relations. In addition, the 1974 circular required that 
refugees sign a statement guaranteeing their duty of reserve in exchange for a residence 
permit. In spite of the circular lacking legal basis, since the Ministry of the Interior was not 
competent in this area, the practice remained and continues. To be sure, there are no legal 
grounds in France for refugees to be bound by an obligation of reserve, and breach of this 
obligation cannot be used as a ground of expulsion per se; that would be illegal. Rather what 
exists in France is freedom of expression and limitations on grounds of public order or 
national security; and it is the latter that have been used as grounds for expulsion.124 
45 In sum, there is very limited jurisprudence and administrative practice relating 
to Art. 2 of the 1951 Convention. Legislation encompassing provisions similar to Art. 2 is 
less scarce, particularly in African countries, thereby reflecting the emphasis on the 
obligations and duties of individuals in African refugee and human rights treaties. 
G. Evaluation 
46 Two key issues came to dominate the debate on the drafting of a provision on the 
general obligations of refugees during the years 1950 and 1951. First, how would such a 
provision take effect: as a mere declaration, as a moral obligation, or as a legal obligation? 
Secondly, what would its scope be, most notably, would it include the prohibition of 
subversive activities of refugees? In spite of these issues having been resolved by 25 July 
1951, when the final text of the 1951 Convention was adopted, new international treaties (of 
refugee law and human rights law) and limited State practice have come to cast some doubt 
on both issues. It is useful here to conclude on the effect and scope of Art. 2 today. 
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the Conseil d’Etat (Council of State, France): Perregaux, 13 May 1977, conclusions Mme Latournerie, and Min 
int. c/Librairie F. Maspero, 30 January 1980, conclusions Mr. Genevois. For further details cf. also Davy on 
Art. 32 MN 62–78, passim. 
47 Regarding the first issue, Art. 2 was designed to be a ‘qualifying clause’ to Art. 1 of 
the 1951 Convention, it was only intended to provide a moral obligation on refugees.125 
Consequently, the non-observance of Art. 2 does not have any effect in international law, as 
opposed to national law; in particular, it does not entail the loss of refugee status or any 
particular right under the 1951 Convention. It also means that in spite of some scholarship 
and State practice to the contrary, Art. 2 does not actually impose a duty of good faith on 
refugees and asylum seekers in international law. The slippery slope to imposing such duties 
is well captured by Gibney: ‘Everywhere one looks one finds examples of refugees being 
publicly criticised for violating various moral norms, expectations and obligations … The 
perceived failure of refugees to fulfil their duties is often used to legitimise curtailing their 
rights through detention and measures that bar access to asylum’.126 
48 Regarding the second issue, Art. 2 was intended to exclude from its scope any 
provision restricting or prohibiting the political activities of refugees because the 1951 
Convention focuses on refugees who seek a peaceful and normal life, and because any such 
reference could be misinterpreted or misconstrued. Instead, it was agreed that remedies 
should continue to be located in national law—with the realization that the 1951 Convention 
would be relevant if the activities in question were serious enough to be caught by Arts. 1 F, 
31, 32, or 33, para. 2. However, provisions restricting the political activities of refugees have 
come to appear in refugee treaties in Africa and Central America, in human rights treaties, 
and in the legislation of several African States. The UNHCR too has recognized the 
prohibition of subversive activities as ‘a means of promoting the civilian character of 
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asylum’.127 Such activities include propaganda for war, incitement to imminent violence, and 
hate speech. It follows that as far as the 1951 Convention is concerned, any breach of a 
prohibition of subversive activities continues to be dealt with under the national law, unless 
the activities are so severe that they fall under other provisions of the 1951 Convention (e.g. 
Art. 33, para. 2). Such breaches may now also be covered by regional refugee law and/or 
international human rights law. However, in spite of limited State practice to the contrary and 
the recognition of certain civil and political rights which may be in conflict with the duties of 
refugees, the effect and scope of Art. 2 remain unchanged. 
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